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The United States Navy purchases millions of dollars worth of major
caliber ammunition each year to supply its warships. These ships have
missions ranging from air defense to gunfire support of amphibious forces on
land. The rounds of ammunition purchased are each individual systems
subject to various forms of failure, and are purchased by component. There
currently exists no systematic method for determining the minimum
acceptable reliability level for round components, reliability levels are
currently established rather arbitrarily, but with some total system reliability
in mind.
The reliability of each of the components impacts the effectiveness of the
weapon system and subsequently the effectiveness of the battle force. In order
to procure and maintain ammunition which will provide adequate utility to
Naval forces, there must be a clear understanding of this relationship of
ammunition reliability and force effectiveness in various missions.
Consider a single round of major caliber ammunition which is comprised
of a small number of components, including fuses, primers, propellant
igniters, propellant, propellant casing, case plug, projectile and explosive.
Each of these major components is in turn an assembly of a number of
subcomponents. A round may experience failures in each of these
subcomponents. While some of the possible failures result in preventing an
effective round from arriving at the target, other failures prevent the gun or
gun cluster from being fired for some period after the failure. In relating
reliability performance to battle force performances, attention must be paid to
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time sensitive situations such as self-defense. The proper measure of
effectiveness, and implied optimal reliability, must take into account the cost
of extra reliability, the value of the target, and the impact of modes of failure
on performance.
The objective of this research is to establish reliability performance
measures, and to specify minimum reliability goals for major caliber
ammunition used in Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) system. The reliability
of ammunition and gun system must be expressed in terms of battle goals
which include mission time, average casualty rate over mission lifetime, and
the percentage of opponent's destructive power disabled at arbitrary time D.
Then the decision maker has the ability to measure reliability performance in
terms of the battle goals with which he is used to dealing.
The approach we took in this research is described in Figure 1.1. We first
developed a simple measure called ef which is a function of reliability
measures of individual components of the ammunition and gun system.
The (theoretical) ef measure represents the expected number of effective
rounds per unit time. The round is considered to be effective if it gets out of
the barrel, hits the target and detonates successfully.
In order to determine reasonable reliability thresholds for ammunition,
we must analyze the integrated system involving rounds, guns, targeting and
scheduling. We compiled the data from various sources including Joint
Munitions Effectiveness Manuals (JMEMS) and the OP-03 Material Readiness
Data Base (MRDB) on the component reliability and gun reliability. This


























Figure 1.1. Flow Diagram of Reliability Goal Determination
We developed a simulation model to find the relationship between ef
values and the battle goals which we call standard performance measures.
The model is designed to simulate the NGFS scenarios to mimic the spotting,
communication and targeting. The simulation results show that the ef
values are highly correlated with the standard performance measures. They
explain variability in observations of the standard performance measures for
different component reliability configurations. Thus the decision maker is
able to determine the effectiveness of ammunition in terms of battle goals.
He can find the minimum (or critical) ef value which is still mission
effective.
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This will support his decision making process on procurement and
surveillance. In procurement decisions, he can specify reliability values for
components and subcomponents which meet minimum requirements for ef
in a most economical way. Ammunition surveillance is the practice of
removing several rounds from a stockpiled lot of ammunition and testing
the reliability of the rounds or of the components. He then can decide
whether or not to perform some sort of rework on an ammunition lot to
improve the reliability to bring it to mission effective status. Currently the
acceptance criteria for pronouncing a stockpiled lot fleet-ready are ad hoc. Our
research proposes replacing the current surveillance test criteria with those
that will ensure that the lot tested exceeds minimum ef in efficiency.
The results of our research can also be utilized to study the impact on
marginal incremental improvements in component reliability for contractors
or procurement agents. We provide an important set of tools useful in
managing procurement and surveillance of ammunition.
The structure of this report is as follows. In Section 2, we develop a
measure of performance of the gun-round system, ef, which represents the
number of effective rounds per unit time. A simulation model is described
in Section 3, which is used to estimate the effectiveness of NGFS given the ef
values. In Section 4, we explain how to run the simulation program, and the
statistical analysis of simulation results. We also describe in some detail the
variance reduction techniques applied to our simulation study, which results
in substantial improvement of simulation output. Section 5 includes the
conclusions and future research.
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2. MEASURING PERFORMANCE OF MAJOR CALIBER AMMUNITION
In this section we begin our exploration of the performance characteristics
of the naval gunfire support system. In particular, we want to establish an
appropriate performance measure to predict variations in the effectiveness of
naval gunfire with respect to changes in round component reliabilities.
The execution of an amphibious assault by combined naval and marine
forces can be conceptually divided into two distinct phases. Phase one, which
we shall call preemptive shelling, occurs prior to the landing of any marine
forces. The objective of preemptive shelling is to reduce the capabilities of
enemy shoreline defenses by bombarding defense positions. This
bombardment is scheduled and directed by naval forces. The schedule is
static; it does not change once the phase commences. Successful execution in
the preemptive shelling phase will increase the probability of success in the
second phase, which we call assault support. The transition to the assault
support phase occurs when marine forces land and take their initial positions.
The assault support phase is characterized by the continual receipt of requests
for bombardment of specific shore defense positions. Calls for assault support
shelling are made by the landed force and supported by spotters stationed near
the targets. These calls for support shelling arrive intermittently and are
serviced based on the priority of the call and the destructive power of the
target.
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2.1 MAJOR CALIBER AMMUNITION
Consider a single round of major caliber ammunition. It is comprised of
a small number of major components, including fuses, primers, propellant
igniters, propellant, propellant casing, case plug, projectile, and explosive.
Each of these major components is in turn an assembly of a number of
subcomponents.
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Figure 2.1. 5-Inch, 54-Caliber Propelling Charge and Projectile
The key functional characteristic of this system is its strictly serial
operation. For example, a typical detonating train consists of a chain of stages
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intended to increase the fuze signal energy level to a degree sufficient to
detonate the explosive payload. The output signal of the sensing equipment
(radar signal, acoustic impulses, hydrostatic pressure, etc.) is sent to a primer.
This device converts electrical or mechanical energy into explosive energy.
Although this energy is minimal, it suffices to trigger an auxiliary detonator.
Following this, the output power of the auxiliary detonator triggers a chain of
insensitive explosives in the booster stage until detonation of the payload
occurs. (See Weapons Systems Fundamentals, NAVORD OP 3000 Vol. 2, First
Revision, for details.) Then for example, if the primer fails, no other
component down the chain will have a chance to operate. It is this simple
serial structure that greatly simplifies the analysis of the possible failure
modes induced by the system, as it will be seen in the following subsection.
2.2 FAILURES
We will continue now with a structural analysis of the common modes
of failure of the single gun round system. We will consider a round to be
effective if it gets out of the barrel, hits the target and detonates successfully.
Otherwise, if any of these conditions is not satisfied, the round will be labelled
as non-effective. There are two operationally distinct failure classes, namely,
interruptive failures and non-interruptive failures. We will assume that
there is a total of N different types of failures with type F\ through type F/v-i
corresponding to interruptive failures and type F^ corresponding to a non-
interruptive failure.
An interruptive failure of type i (F
z , i
= 1, ..., N-l) is caused by a
malfunction of the round, the gun, or the crew, which causes the gun to stop
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firing for some time T,. Examples of interruptive failures are firing pin
failures, or failures in the propellant chain. An interruptive failure causes
the system to stop firing for some time T, in order to fix the problem, after
which the system performs as before.
A non-interruptive failure occurs when the round is successfully fired
from a gun barrel but fails to cause effective damage to the target. Causes for
this might be a faulty or incorrectly set variable time fuse, insufficient initial
velocity, guidance errors, faulty detonation or even targeting errors caused by
the crew. Although no effective damage is done to the target, a non-
interruptive failure does not affect the gun in any other way, i.e., a non-
interruptive failure does not affect the future firing rate of the gun.
For the current analysis we have assumed that T, , i = 1, ..., N are known
and deterministic values. (We plan to extend this work to include randomly
distributed repair times). We will also normalize these values according to
the firing rate of the gun, i.e., if the gun is firing at 18 rounds/minute, we
then measure T, in units of 1/18 minutes. In this manner the down times
caused by each particular failure will be weighted proportionally to the firing
rate of the gun, so that a 10-minute interruption is considered worse for a gun
shooting at a high firing rate than a gun shooting at a lower rate. This also
implies that an effective round and a non-interruptive failure each take one
unit of time.
Consider again a single round of a major caliber ammunition. The linear
nature of this system allows us to model the system so that the lower levels of
failure take precedence over the higher levels. Then, the failure (conditional)
probabilities that can be estimated by observation are given by
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x\ = P[F\ occurs]
Xi = P[Fi occurs | no Fj occurred for j < i],
for i = 2, ..., N. Hence, the probabilities of the different failure types may be
computed as
(\i - P[Fi occurs]
q x = P[F{ occurs and no Fj occurs for ; < i].
By the way we have defined the observed conditional probabilities (x/s) the
failure types are independent and therefore
qi =xiY[(l-xj ) (2.1)1
for i = 1, .... N. Thus, the qi values will allow us to compute the reliability
measure for the single gun-round system.
2.3 A MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE OF THE GUN-ROUND SYSTEM
We now present a measure of performance of the gun-round system
based on the time required to deliver an effective round on the target. Recall
that a round is considered effective upon successful detonation on the target.
Let the random variable T





= YlPiTi} + 1 (2-2)
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where P, is the number of failures of type i occurring between effectively
delivered rounds, i.e., the Pj's are geometric random variables with parameter







= ^(l- Pi )pf.
(2.3)
(2.4)
There is a very important relationship between these two moments that
serves to consolidate our objectives, namely, monotonicity. As it will be seen
in the following theorem, the expected value and the variance of the random
variable T
p
increase and decrease together. In evaluating the performance of
a given set of components with associated X{ values, low variance of Tp is
desirable as well as low expected value. This theorem guarantees that
components giving lowest expected time between effective rounds also give
the lowest variance. Thus, we are interested in decreased values of both E[Tp ]
and var[T
p],
and these goals do not conflict in any way.
THEOREM 2.1. Given two alternatives p and p in [0, 1] , if E 71 <E T-[7 , then
var T„ < var T-
PROOF. We will show that for two points p and p suitably close to one
another, that VET
p (p-p) and Vvar T„ [p~p) have the same sign. Thus,
descent directions for E
the product
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= (p-p) A(p-f) (2.5)
which is a quadratic form in the matrix A. It is simple to determine that A is





p\ (P-P) Vvar(^) (P-P) >0 (2.6)
for any vector [p-p). Hence, we may conclude that in a suitably small
r„ are also descentneighborhood of any point p, descent directions for E
directions for van T . []
Backed by the results of the above theorem we can now define a measure
of performance of the gun-round system as:
ef = 1 / E(Tp
J
= round efficiency. (2.7)
This quantity represents the number of effective rounds per unit time (again
measured in firing epochs). As will be seen in the following section the
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simulation results confirm that ef represents a good measure of performance
of the naval gunfire support system, highly correlated with both the
destruction time of the target and the destructive power left by time t.
Example 1
Eight failure types known to cause a preponderance of the failures
experienced by a naval gun are given below in Table 2.1 along with their
interruption (repair) times. These times were derived from studying the
figure "Hot Gun Misfire Procedures and Safety Time Schedule for 5-inch, 54-
caliber Guns Mark 45 Mods and 1". Failure type descriptions are given in
Table 2.2, with some symptom information, remedy, and the interruption
time for each. When two numbers are provided they are for hot and cold gun
situations. Repair of these types of failures on a hot gun require that the gun
be cooled for 30 minutes before repair can begin. This assumes that an
automatic internal cooling system can be employed. The wait is two hours
with no cooling system. Finally we evaluate the efficiency of a round under
these conditions.
TABLE 2.1
Failure Type Description Data Status
1 Loader Microswitch Fails E
2 Firing Circuit Fails E
3 Breachblock Closed E
4 Firing Pin Fails E
5 Propellant Primer Fails D
6 Propellant Impurity D
7 Fuse Fails or is Missed D
8 Detonation Train Fails D
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12
The qualifier data status is E if the probability of failure must be estimated
from data provided from a gun failure data base, while those with data status
D are failure types whose probabilities are variable, open to decision.
TABLE 2.2
Fi Description/Symptom Remedy Ti Pi
1 Round jammed, loader stops Mechanically
unjam
25/55 0.05




4 Electronics work but no fires
occur
e.g., Replace pin 21/51 0.02







6,7,8 Non-interruptive failure Shoot again 1 /firing
rate
0.01
Based on the above data and the equations provided in the previous
subsection we evaluated the efficiency of the round for a gun shooting at 20
rounds/minute and obtained ef = 0.16, i.e., 16% of each round is effective. In
other words, if we assume that 10 rounds are necessary to destroy the target,
then given ef = 0.16, we will need an average of 62.5 firing epochs to deliver
10 effective rounds.
2.4 PURPOSE OF ef
As it will be seen in the following section, the simulation model (and the
associated computer program) will allow us to determine the appropriate
value of ef in order to meet battle goals with respect to the time required to
destroy all targets, the casualty rate, destructive power left by time D, etc. The
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selected number for ef, say ef*, will thus represent a global measure to be
satisfied by all types of ammunition and guns in the system, ensuring in this
way that the battle objectives will be met.
It should be noted that many individual components are either common
to different guns or to different ammunitions, e.g., two different models of
the same type of gun may share the same firing circuit. Therefore, the
decision as to what the minimum reliability requirements are for all the
components in the system should be taken globally, i.e., the result of a model
that includes all guns and all ammunitions simultaneously. In other words,
each different round of ammunition and each gun in the system will have to
satisfy an equation of the type E[T
p ]
< 1/ef*.
A system like the one described above possesses an infinite number of
solutions. It is possible, in order to simplify the selection of a particular
solution, to include an objective function, e.g., minimum procurement cost.
This last step is dependent upon knowledge of the different costs associated
with buying components of different reliabilities, information that we




We have developed a simulation model to estimate the relationship
between ef and other standard performance measures which include mission
duration, average casualty rate over mission lifetime, and the percentage of
opponent destructive power disabled at arbitrary time D. The model took the
following aspects into account:
i) gun reliability
ii) spotting,
iii) targets and target hardness,
iv) navigation error,
v) guidance error,
vi) fluctuation in initial velocity
vii) ships and guns and dependence, and
viii) all possible JMEMS data.
The goal of the simulation model was not to simulate a particular known
engagement, but to give decision makers a feel for the impact of varying ef
values in terms they are used to considering (standard performance
measures). The simulation results show that ef explains nearly all variability
in observations of the percentage of targets destroyed at arbitrary time D, the
time required to destroy all the targets, and the casualty rate.
The simulation will also provide the decision maker with the statistical
properties of these measures. Thus the decision maker has the ability to




The decisions he will make involve procurement and surveillance. In
procurement decisions, he will specify reliability values which meet
minimum requirements for ef, and which are most economical. In
surveillance, disassembled rounds will be tested piece by piece. If the round
still is within the minimum ef standard, it is still mission effective. If not,
the rework required to bring it to mission effective status can be prescribed in
a cost-effective way. Thus the critical value of ef must be established.
3.1 THE MODEL
The model is designed to mimic the spotting, communication, targeting,
and destruction aspects of the NGFS system. The system consists of several
ships, each equipped with one or more naval guns. These guns are tasked to
prosecute and destroy a prespecified set of targets by a specified time.
Interfering with the gunfire are inaccuracies in the fall of shot, inaccuracies in
the ship's internal navigation system, gun system interruptions and failures,
and ammunition failures. We now describe the simulated processes in more
detail.
3.1.1 The Target List
The specified targets reside on a target list which gives each target's type,
the lethality points for the targets, and each target's field of view. The target
type is referenced to a target type list which gives detailed information on the
method of engagement for the target type. An example of a target type may be




Point values are assigned to each of the targets to control the manner in
which they are engaged. Generally speaking, targets are engaged in a highest-
points-first regime, with exceptions made for partially destroyed targets.
When the NGFS scenario begins, the targets with the highest point
values are taken from the target list and engaged, one target per gun. Each
target is prosecuted until it is destroyed, or until the gun engaging it suffers a
severe casualty. If the target is disengaged and not destroyed, it is returned to
the target list in its current state of damage. The scenario is not considered
complete until all targets on the list have been destroyed.
3.1.2 Spotting
Each target is first engaged by using a bracketing method for spotting the
rounds. The brackets are established as shown in Figure 3.1. Two points are
established behind (Pl for Plong) and in front of (Ps for Pshort) the target.
Around each point, a box is established. The evolution starts as the ship
attempts to place a round in Box L, Xl is an acceptable long spotting round.
Then, the ship attempts to place a round in the short box, say at Xs- The
distance from Pl or Ps to the target, and the width and length of the spotting
boxes are specified for each target type. Note that if the distance from Ps to the
target is specified as 0.0, the gun performs single-shot spotting on the target.
The preceding description fits the actions of a ship engaging its first target.
If, however, the ship has just destroyed an adjacent target, this bracket
procedure may be overly cautious and time consuming. Hence, if the ship
immediately engages a target within the same field of view as the target just



















Figure 3.1. Target Spotting
3.1.3 Firing for Effect (FFE)
Once adequate spotting has been performed, the ship will fire for effect on
the target. This involves firing at a position exactly between the two spotting
locations, as at the last single-shot spotting location. The gun fires a salvo the
size of which is specified by the target type, each round following the previous
one by a delay equal to the specified cycle time of the gun.
3.1.4 Destruction
The combination of the impact point, the round type, and the target type
allows us to specify the amount of damage done to the target. Each round-
target type gives us an effective casualty radius (ECR) within which some
damage to the target can be expected. Each target type has a specified number
of lifepoints, and a number of points it loses if the round lands within the
ECR and fuses successfully called hitpoints. We further downgrade the
18
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effectiveness of the round by a probability of damage, which is conditioned on
the round landing within the ECR and fusing. Between the hitpoints,
lifepoints, and this conditional probability, the analyst has significant
modeling flexibility. When a target's lifepoints are no longer positive, it is
destroyed.
3.1.5 Battle Damage Assessment
After an effect salvo is fired, there is a delay before the disposition of the
engaged target is known to the ship. Contingent upon the condition of the
target, the ship may do one of three things. If the target is unharmed, the ship
attempts to respot the target; if the target is damaged but not destroyed, the
ship fires another salvo for effect; if the target is destroyed, the ship engages a
new target.
3.1.6 Navigation Error and Registration Rounds
Prior to attempting to spot its first target, each ship experiences some error
in its navigation solution as well as some gun-system bias. These two effects
conspire to make the gun system less accurate. It is a common practice to fire
several registration rounds at a point outside the target field, and to track the
landing point of these targets using the ship's radar. From this data we form
an estimate of the bias carried by the ship's navigation system so that future
firings are more accurate.
3.1.7 Found Aimpoints and Spotting Inaccuracies
When the ship fires a round, it does so at a specified aimpoint (xA,yA)
given in (x,y) coordinates. The round, due to several exogenous conditions,
lands at some nearby point (xi,yi). In our model, we assume that the
difference between (xA,yA) and (xi/Yi) is a bivariate normal random variable.
19
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With mean (0, 0) and variance which is specified in the data set. Each gun is
allowed a different variance, and each round type may magnify this
inaccuracy as appropriate.
When a spotter observes the impact point relative to the target, he
advises the ship to adjust the aimpoint by the observed error, as opposed to
the aimpoint' s inaccuracy. See Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2. Aimpoint Adjustment
This process continues until the impact point satisfies the spotting criteria.
3.2 GUN AND ROUND FAILURES
Of primary interest in this research is the effect that gun system and
ammunition failures have upon the overall performance of the NGFS
system. As discussed above, the system experiences failures which are of two
distinct types, these being interruptive and noninterruptive failures. Each
failure is modeled to occur with a given probability of each firing of the gun,
and each failure is assumed to be independent of all previous firings.
Furthermore, the observation of failures is hierarchical, so that the
occurrence of a failure masks occurrences of failures of components further
2/22/91.11:38 AM.20
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down the detonation train. Upon recovery from a failure, the system is
assumed good-as-new.
3.2.1 Noninterruptive failures
Modeling noninterruptive failures is quite straightforward. If one of
these failures occurs during the spotting process, the round is assumed to be
unobserved by the spotter. Hence, the spotter will require that an additional
spotting round be fired at the current spotting aimpoint. During the FFE
phase of the mission, the round is simply ineligible to inflict damage upon
the target.
3.2.2 Interruptive failures
The duration of an interruptive failure changes depending on whether
the gun is hot or not. Upon an interruptive failure during either phase of a
mission, there is a possibility that the gun should be taken off-line to be
repaired, and the engaged target should be made available to other guns. This
target release evolution occurs when the gun is expected to be down for more
than TOO LONG time units. The target becomes reengageable by another gun
after RELEASE TIME units. The values of TOO LONG and RELEASE TIME
are specified in the scenario.
If the failure is not severe enough to release the target, the actions of the
system depend on the mission phase at the time of failure. If spotting is
interrupted by a failure, the spotting resumes by firing at the original spotting
location. If the gun is firing for effect, the resumption of firing involves
shooting the entire salvo over again. However, when FFE is interrupted it is
possible that the target has already been destroyed. Thus, BDA is done upon
21
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every interruption of an FFE. An interruption of an FFE could, in this
manner, result in reassigning the failed gun to a new target upon recovery.
3.3 DATA FILE PRODUCTION
The generation of data for the model falls into three general areas. First is
the collection and evaluation of scenarios. Second is the translation of
known targets to JMEMS targets and the evaluation of munitions effects.
Third is the evaluation of gun system reliability. All of this data is destined
for the scenario data file of the simulation AMMO.
3.3.1 Collection and Evaluation of Scenarios
There were three scenarios considered for use in the study, based on
amphibious actions in the Middle East, northern Europe, and the northern
Pacific. The Mideast scenario is a helo-borne landing and therefore does not
meet the requirements of the study. The Northern Europe scenario is an
unopposed landing and, thus, does not meet the requirements of this study
either. The third scenario was a northern Pacific scenario with many targets
designated to be assigned to prelaunch strikes by naval air and naval gun
assets. Specifically 18 targets were evaluated as being assigned to NGFS. The
NGFS time window for these targets is the 48 hours preceding the scheduled
landing time. We used this scenario as the basis of our model runs.
Specific detail about the targets other than location, elevation and general
nomenclature was not available, therefore assumptions had to be made about
the targets. It was assumed, for example, that AA battalion headquarters
would be fortified in such a manner as to present the damage profile of an
armored personnel carrier. It was assumed that each surface-to-air missile
22
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battery had eight surface-to-air missiles. It was also assumed that an aviation
regiment would be comprised of eight aircraft. With regard to the
navigational error, it was assumed that beacons were set in place on the beach
for geographical reference and aid in navigation. Ships were assumed to be
able to maneuver, gain, and maintain, a range of 12,000 yards to each target as
it was taken under fire.
3.3.2 Target Translation










The JMEMS target list considered was as follows:






FROG 7B ROCKET POINT AND AREA TARGETS
BMP ARMORED INFANTRY VEHICLE
PERSONNEL TARGETS
For the target translation, EW, GCI, and SW sites were considered to be
predominantly antenna arrays and electronics equipment, therefore they
translated to CROSS SLOT radar for obtaining input data for the simulation
23
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from the JMEMS publications. HQs translated to hardened targets with a
larger target radius than most hard targets. AA battery translated to a 152MM
field gun. Helo and aviation squadrons translated to sepal cruise missiles.
SAM battery translated to FROG 4 rocket.
From this translation we were able to generate the target type list in the
data file described in Section 4.
3.3.3 Gun System Reliability
The 5-inch Gun Mount has 53 reliability blocks which are all in series. A
reliability block diagram is a model of a system or operational mode, broken
down to a level in which all components in each block are either all
energized or all nonenergized at any point in time (NAVSEAINST 3500.1A
Advance Draft). Reliability block diagrams (RBD) are used by the Fleet
Analysis Center to determine reliability measurements of Navy ship systems.
The RBDs for a particular system were developed by the engineering and
maintenance support activities at the direction of the cognizant system
program manager.
The OPNAV 4798/2K is the primary source for the Material Readiness
Data Base (MRDB). In addition the MRDB is augmented with casualty report
messages, employment tapes, and other supplementary data sources. Data
collected from the start of the data base in January 1984 until August 1986
includes information from the NAVSEA Non-expendable Shipboard
Equipment Status Logs, form 4855/2, which are no longer required. Data
from 1984 to 1986 was used because it includes the equipment status log
information. It is a source of continuous real time observation and actual
clock readings. The mean time between failures (MTBF) and the mean time
24
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to repair (MTTR) were obtained for each of the 53 RBD's from the MRDB.
The RBD MTBFs and MTTRs were used instead of the system reliability to
avoid the data base scenario adjustments of system reliability that are made
using a demand factor for each of the RBDs based on the percentage of time it
is energized during a typical mission life normalized by a ratio of energized
time to real clock time, aggregated over all units reporting. We wanted to use
as pure a number as possible and therefore modeled the individual 53 RBDs
in the simulation and used the unadjusted data from the 1984 to 1986 time
frame.
3.3.4 Data Collection Postmortem
There is a mismatch between those targets that we are describing in our
scenarios and the information about the specific effect of our ammunition on
targets that we were able to develop at this time. We are in the process of
getting the effects data needed from the JMEM Munition Effects Working
Group. Our scenarios should be generated with the same level of granularity
or scale as the JMEMS publications, so that translation, if required, can be
done in reasonable fashion. In terms of our own systems, there needs to be a
methodical way to collect information in order to support reliability
calculations, and to do so in such a way as to isolate those periods of time
when the systems are specifically in a mission state. It does no good for us to
evaluate our systems at 90 percent reliability, lets say, according to the data
base when the system does not work 50 percent of the time while it is on the
firing line. System reliability for a mission may not be accurate for the mark




Because of these factors, it was deemed valuable that NGFS be observed so
that some idea of validation of the model could be obtained. The observation
of one ship does not suffice to validate the simulation model, but it did not
invalidate the model. It was encouraging to see that the rate of fire of the ship
in actual clock time was similar to that predicted by the model. It was also
encouraging to see the gun perform as well as it did as the ship's crew became
acclimated to the environment of NGFS.
4.0 RUNNING THE SIMULATION
In this section, we describe the data files required to operate the
simulation model, and the output attainable.
4.1 DATA FILES
There are two data files required to run the simulation AMMO. These
files are known as the scenario and run control files. The scenario file, an
example of which is shown in Figure 4.1, contains three distinct sections:
timing information, target description information, and ship-gun-round
system description information. Finally, there is a list of seeds used in the
simulation.
All of the data collected from the FLTTAC, JMEMS, and other sources is
destined for the scenario data file. The scenario supplied by NWSC was used
to choose the targets and target types, and to specify the numbers of ships and
guns. In addition, the data on the timing and accuracy of the gun system was




5.5 bdatim, the time (in min.) it takes to do BDA
3.5 spttim, the time between spotting round
2 numgun, the number of guns in the scenario
1 numshp, the number of ships in the scenario
2 numshl, the number of shell types used in the scenario
4 numtgt, the number of targets
2 numtty, the number of target types
100. dtime, the time of the amphibious assault
1 dswtch, 1 means the simulation stops at dtime, means destroy all targets
4 regmd, number of registration rounds each ship shoots at the beginning of each
scenario




two 1 "99 2
three 2 45 1
four 2 56 2
TARGET TYPES—id, shltyp, lifpts, hitpts, effect, ecr, deflct, jmemsp, ecrlng, pcorct, blng,
bwd
type 11 10 3 5 50 20 0.90 1 1.0 1.5 1.0
type 2 1 10 3 5 50 20 0.90 1 1.0 1.5 1.0
SHIPS—ship nav error sigshp (., 1) sigshpC, 2)
100.0 100.0 standard errors, x and y, of the ship nav system
GUNS—ship, gnumf, hotrnd, siggun(., 1), siggunC, 2), cycle (one per gun)
gfailp, gfailt(cold, hot) (one per failure mode of the gun)
1 2 10 20.0 60.0 0.05
0.05 1.0 2.0
0.10 0.0 0.0
1 2 10 20.0 60.0 0.05
0.05 1.0 2.0
0.10 0.0 0.0
SHELLS—snumf, sigshlC, 1), sigshl(., 2) (one per shell type)










Figure 4.1. Scenario Data
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The blocks of data pertaining to the guns and shells may be nonintuitive
in their design. The first line for each gun description gives, in order, the
ship on which the gun is mounted, the number of failure types for the gun,
the number of rounds fired before the gun is considered hot, the standard
errors of the dispersion of shot for the gun (x and y), and the time between
rounds fired for effect for the gun. The next several lines of data are the
probability of occurrence and the recovery times (cold and hot) for each
failure type.
The blocks of data pertaining to the shell types are structured similarly.
The first line gives the number of failures for the shell type, followed by the
additional dispersion caused by the round. The following lines give the
probability of occurrence, and the recovery time (cold and hot) for each failure
type.
A second file, the run control data file, contains some simple information
used to limit the runs of the simulation and to implement our experimental
design. An example of the run control file is given in Figure 4.2. The run
control file specifies the maximum duration of any single simulation run,
MAXTIME, the level of accuracy required of each of the performance
measures, PCT, and the maximum number of replications a given
experiment is allowed to run, MAXREPS. For example, if MAXREPS is 200
and PCT is 0.05, then the simulation experiment will stop when
1) the confidence interval half width is less than 5% of the mean for each
performance measure, or
2) 200 replications have been completed.
Lines 4-6 of the file concern the "scrunching" of ECR values. As has been
mentioned in the discussion of JMEMS data, it was often seen that a given
28
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round-target pair would have an effective casualty radius of 850 meters and a
probability of destruction of 0.01. We found this unreasonable and devised a
crude way to make the probability of destruction increase by insisting on more
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Figure 4.2. Run Control File
We made the assertion that, within limits, ECR x Pr[destruct] = C for
some constant C corresponding to the firepower of the round against the
target. The aforementioned limits are established in lines 4 and 5 of the data.
R gives the minimum ECR value for any round-target combination, while
PMAX gives the maximum Pr[destruction]. The program, when instructed,
will attempt to concentrate firepower until one of these bounds becomes
tight. Experimentally, we have found that the simulation predicted highest
gun efficiency when R was equal to the round dispersion standard error given
in the scenario data file.
The last several lines give the experimental design, which is of the
complete factorial type. We are interested in the behavior of each of our
performance measures when the probabilities of failure of each of the round
components are varied. By convention, we vary the probability of failure for
29
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round type 1 in the experiment. If the scenario involves several round types,
the user should manipulate the scenario data file so that round type 1 is the
round of primary interest for the run.
The design is given by the number of levels, the lower limit, and the
upper limit of the probability of failure for each failure type for round type 1.
Thus, if the line corresponding to failure type 1 in the run control file is given
as
3 0.01 0.03,
then type 1 failure probabilities will vary over the set {0.01, 0.02, 0.03}. If the
number of levels for a failure type is given as 1, the probability of failure
reverts to that found in the scenario data file.
4.2 Model Responses
When the model runs, the user's screen is notified of the number of
experiments that will be performed in the run, the number completed thus
far, and the number of replications finished for the current experiment.
Upon completion of each experiment, the user is notified of the number of
replications of the experiment which were censored because the targets were
not all destroyed before MAXTIME. The number of censored runs should be
small (ideally 0!) for each experiment. If this number becomes a significant
portion of the sample size for the experiment, the values of the scenario,
failure, or MAXTIME, should be reconsidered.
When the simulation does run successfully, the output is given in the
form shown in Figure 4.3. Estimates of the primary measures of
performance, the mean scenario completion time, the time average of the
30
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KEEPON = F OF 10REPS CENSORED
THE NUMBER OF REPLICATIONS REQUIRED WAS
THE AVERAGE MISSION LIFETIME =
VARIANCE OF THE MEAN =
STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE MEAN =
THE TIME AVG OF THE TARGET VALUE =
VARIANCE OF THE MEAN =
STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE MEAN =
ROUNDS PER MINUTE BY GUN
1 1 289 WITH STD ERROR .146
2 1 612 WITH STD ERROR .101
3 1 326 WITH STD ERROR .148
4 1 387 WITH STD ERROR .124
5 1 338 WITH STD ERROR .120




WITH STD ERROR 059
OF TARGETS DEAD AT DTIME =
VARIANCE OF THE MEAN =
STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE MEAN =
THE AVG SURVIVING TGT VAL AT DTIME =
VARIANCE OF THE MEAN =
STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE MEAN =
GUN 1 THE AVG ROUNDS PER MISSION =
VARIANCE OF THE MEAN =
STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE MEAN =
GUN 2 THE AVG ROUNDS PER MISSION =
VARIANCE OF THE MEAN =
STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE MEAN =
GUN 3 THE AVG ROUNDS PER MISSION =
VARIANCE OF THE MEAN =
STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE MEAN =
GUN 4 THE AVG ROUNDS PER MISSION =
VARIANCE OF THE MEAN =
STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE MEAN =
GUN 5 THE AVG ROUNDS PER MISSION =
VARIANCE OF THE MEAN =
STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE MEAN =
GUN 6 THE AVG ROUNDS PER MISSION =
VARIANCE OF THE MEAN =
































Figure 4.3. Example Output File
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surviving target value, and the target value surviving at DTIME are
prominently displayed. In addition, we report several sets of statistics
concerning the experiences of each gun used. This report is generated by the
program only when the number of experiments in the design equals 1. That
is, only when a simple simulation run using the scenario data values is done.
When there is more than one experiment in a design, the results are given in




5.0 DETERMINING RELIABILITY GOALS
In the previous sections, we have produced descriptions of the analytic
reliability measure ef, and of the simulation analysis system. In the most
fundamental terms, ef is a simple function of reliability measures of
individual ammunition and gun system components. The simulation also
uses the reliability data, as well as other system performance characteristics
and an NGFS scenario as input. The output of the simulation is a set of battle
goal results, as listed in Figure 4.3. Let us denote these k battle goal values by
the vector bg(bgi, bg2, ..., bgk).
The reason for developing the simulation model is that components of bg
have relevance and meaning to our prospective decision maker. Given a
vector of battle goal results, we expect the decision maker to be able to
determine if the performance of the system is acceptable. Pursuing this
expectation, we compel the decision maker to specify a function
¥: 9tk -> {0,1}
so that ^(bg) = 1 if and only if the outcome bg is acceptable in terms of
performance, ^(bg) = if not. For simplicity, we will assume that W has the
following form:
jl iff ha < be* i = l, 2, ..., k
¥(bg)= & B (5.1)
(0 otherwise.
( * *\Hence bg* = bgl7 bg^, ..., bgk is the decision maker's threshold performance
vector. Obviously some sign-switching will be necessary so that this
threshold vector makes physical sense.
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We propose that bg is a function,
bg:[0,l]->$Rk
so that each battle goal is a function of ef, bg(e/) e SRk . Hence, we submit the
following procedure for establishing reliability goals for major caliber
ammunition components:
1. specify a set of N experimental reliabilities for each ammunition
component for each round type.
2. specify bg*;
3. i = l,2, ...,N
i. Calculate efc
ii. estimate bg(e/i) via AMMO;
4. ef* = mm{efi :Y(b&(efi )) = l}
i
L J
The validity of the above procedure is based on the assumption that bgi is
nondecreasing in ef for each i.
Example 2.
From our preliminary analysis, we chose the battle goals as follows:
bgi = total mission time;
bg2 = total firepower of threat at 1 hour after engagement begins
bg3 = time-integrated point value of targets
bg4 = percentage of targets left undestroyed at time of invasion, 48 hours
after engagement begins.
Obviously the best of all possible situations is to have bg = [0,0,0,0] T .
We expect the decision maker to specify the threshold vector bg* so that
we can, in turn, provide a threshold ef*. Obviously, lower values of the
components of bg* will face the value of ef* up. The usefulness of ef* is that




Given that the decision maker has specified a threshold level of
performance bg*, how must we deal with this threshold? For each round
type, we are required to meet the attendant effectiveness threshold ef*. The
round types are considered to operate in a fixed environment, including the
reliability performance of the gun system the round is used with. Thus, of all
of the system component reliabilities that impact the calculation of ef for a
round type, only the round component reliabilities are under our control.
Let us consider one round type with round components 1, 2, ..., k and
exogenous components k + 1, k + 2, ..., N the exogenous components being
those of the intended gun system. We hope to provide round to the fleet
such that pi, p2, ..., pk- The k probabilities of failure for each of the round
components are small enough so that ef* > ef*. If this is not the case, then
one or more of the component reliabilities must be improved in order for the
round to conform to the specified reliability threshold.
The decision maker we allude to actually performs two roles, he procures
ammunition components for assembly with currently held components to
make new rounds, and he monitors the reliability of existing stockpiles of
ammunition. When monitoring the stockpiles, he decides whether or not to
perform some set of rework upon an ammunition lot to improve the
reliability performance of the lot.
5.1.1 The Procurement Decision
For the procurement process, we will assume that the decision maker
currently has in place procurement mechanisms for k-1 of the round
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components, and has a high degree of confidence in the value of Xj,
j = 1, 2, ..., N, j * i, the failure rates of the individual components. He needs a
reliability goal for component i, that is, he needs to specify the maximum
allowable Xj which will produce a round conforming to the overall reliability
threshold.





Isolating pi, this constraint becomes
A^l S P (5.3)















This is our reliability goal for component i.
We have related the constraint of the effectiveness of a round to the
failure rate of the component to be procured. We recommend that acceptance
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tests for the new component establish x
}
as the upper control limit for the
percent defective in all procured lots of component i.
Finally, if component i is to be used to build rounds of several different
types, the reliability goal should be set by the round type establishing the
lowest Xj.
5.1.2 The Surveillance Decision
Ammunition surveillance is the practice of removing several rounds
from a stockpiled lot of ammunition and testing the rounds. This testing is
done in two modes, these being total-system and component-wise. Currently,
the acceptance criteria for pronouncing a stockpiled lot fleet-ready are ad hoc.
We propose replacing the current surveillance test criteria with those that
will ensure that the lot tested exceeds ef* in efficiency.
Usually, only a subset of the components in a round are selected for
component-wise surveillance testing. From the tests, we can easily establish
an upper confidence limit on the value of Xj for each round component i
which is tested.
Components that cannot or are not tested component-wise are tested in
the total-system test. During the total system test, the number of failures
which is interruptive should be counted and classified, so that upper control
limits are established for p;, the expected number of failures of type i which
occur between successful rounds. Failures of types which are attributed to
components tested component-wise are used to sharpen the estimates of the
failure rates for these components.
Thus, after the initial surveillance tests, we will have an estimate of ef for
the lot. If this estimate is above ef*, we allow the lot to remain in the
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stockpile and proclaim the lot to be conforming to our reliability goal. If the
lot is not conforming, the decision maker has the option of replacing one or
more of the components in each round in the lot. He has knowledge of the
failure rate of the replacement components he has at hand, so he may
determine whether performing the replacement will bring the lot into
conformance with the reliability goal. No doubt, this rework decision has an
economic aspect we do not address.
5.1.3 Evaluating Marginal Improvements
As we have developed ef as our performance measure, it is incumbent
upon us to exploit the functional nature of ef to determine relationships
between incremental improvements in reliability, training, or operations and
fleet effectiveness in NGFS. We do this by taking partial derivatives.
Consider the following two equations;





As < pi, ef < 1, we know that def/dT-, e [-1,0], while def/dp^ e [0,1].
Equation 1 primarily addresses training of crew members, as better trained
crews will shorten recovery times from gun or ammunition failures.
Equation 1 tells us that the greatest operational payoff comes from reducing
the recovery time of failures which occur most frequently, that is, with low
values of pj. Note further that Equation 1 does not explicitly involve Tj, so
that we see clearly that frequency of failure is more important than severity.
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Equation 2 tells us that incremental improvements in reliability of
individual components are ordered by the ratio Tj/pj. The greater this ratio,
the more important an incremental improvement in Xj will be. Note that
Tj/pj is large when Tj is large and . .
.
Xj is large. The upshot of this discussion is that
i) crews should train with the goal of reducing the recovery time for the
most frequent failures;
ii) contractors, and procurement agents should weigh incremental
improvements in component reliability using the ratio Tj/pi.
Conclusion (ii) has direct impact on determining bonus values for contractors
who exceed reliability specifications in their contracts.
5.2 Output Analysis
An experiment was designed whose purpose was to determine the
functional relationship between each of the battle goals and the value of ef.
The experiment consisted of three steps:
i) the simulation for K of different combinations of round component
failure rates, executing M replications per combination;
ii) for each of the KM runs, exploit the difference between the observed
value of ef and its known expectation to adjust the battle goal outcome
for the run;
iii) develop a set of regression metamodels used to determine the
functional relationship between each battle goal's expected value and
the theoretical value of ef.
The experiment was performed for K = 34 and M = 200, using a stylization
of a scenario provided by NWSC. The data used was perturbed from realistic
values so as to avoid any classification constraints. In the following
discussion, we will treat the following two battle goals,
i) bgi = mean mission duration;
ii) bg2 = time average of enemy's firepower;
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where firepower is given by each target's value, see Section 3.1.1. A direct
relationship between the time average of the enemy's firepower and expected
troop loss can be made if one (unrealistically) expects the amphibious assault
to begin at the beginning of the scenario.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the outcome of our experiment. In each figure,
each datum represents the average response from the 200 runs of one failure
rate combination, after adjustment as described in Step ii. This adjustment
was performed using the linear control variate method, see Bratly, Fox, and
Schrage [1983].
Briefly, this method consists of modifying each response from the
simulation as
% = Vi-PH-ef\ (5.8)
where Yj is the i th replication of the random variable Y, and efc is the ith
observation of the random variable EF. Since E[EF-ef] = 0, we have
E[ Y] = E[Yj] for each i. it is well known that the best choice of [5 is given by
cov[£F,Y]^EgL (5.9)
var[£FJ
as we don't know the value of p, we estimate the required quantities from
each of the K experimental combinations of failure rates. These estimates are
shown graphically in Figure 5.3. Figure 5.4 graphically illustrates the
reduction in variance in the mean response of each of the experimental
combinations for the time-averaged fire power battle goal. The reductions in
variance are in the neighborhood of 40-50% for this battle goal. Thus, by
exploiting the difference between the simulation's experimental outcome for
40
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0.74 0.76 0.78 0.80 0.82 0.84
Theoretical ef
Figure 5.1. Battle Goal 1 Plotted as a Function of Theoretical ef
For the two battle goals, we see the fit of the two regression metamodels
we constructed using standard techniques, see Kleijnen [1975]. Our estimates
of the linear relationship between ef and each of the battle goals is given as
bgi = 427.62 - 415.79 ef (5.10)
bg> = 1693.2 - 1069.4 ef (5.11)
Both fits were subjected to standard regression diagnostics, and both were























0.74 0.76 0.78 0.80
Theoretical ef
0.82 0. 84
Figure 5.2. Battle Goal 2 Plotted as a Function of Theoretical ef
It is worth noting that with our combination of variance reduction technique
and linear metamodel, we are regressing our battle goal outcomes on the
quantities efi - ef and ef, and that these two calculations are pursued for very
different ends.
Setting Reliability Goals, an Example
Suppose that the decision maker makes the determination that for the
targets and scenario described, that the battle goal threshold is bg* = (100,860).
That is, the mission execution is determined to be below acceptable levels of
performance if it takes 100 minutes, or if the time-integrated fire power score
is greater than 860. Using the regression metamodels, we see that executing
the mission time constraint implies that ef > 0.788, while meeting the fire
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power constraint implies that ef > 0.779. Thus, from this simple analysis, we




















































































































What we have endeavored to provide to the managers of the U.S. Navy's
major caliber ammunition program are the following:
i) a measure of performance which relates defect rates of ammunition
components to battle force performance;
ii) a simulation model to assist government analysts in establishing
threshold values for the performance measure;
iii) a methodology for prescribing maximum defect rates for ammunition
components to ensure that new and stockpiled ammunition conforms
to specified threshold levels.
Hence, we have an important set of tools useful in managing procurement
and surveillance of ammunition.
It is our view that these tools should be integrated into a system of
evaluation, physical experiment, data production, and procurement and
surveillance decisions. The weakness of the tools we have produced thus far
are that the simulation model is not verifiable—we cannot match simulation
output with that of a physical experiment. Figure 6.1 shows our concept of an
integrated reliability performance evaluation system. What follows are
remarks concerning each component of this system.
6.1 LIVE FIRE EXPERIMENTS
Naval forces use their major caliber guns in exercises and qualification
tests and equipment acceptance tests throughout the year. The gun
component reliability and recovery time data available through current
sources are not very complete and do not address the needs of performance
analysis of ammunition. The establishment of our analysis tools should
45
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compel the major caliber ammunition program to identify and collect data
from these live fire experiments, especially with regard to gun system failure
















Figure 6.1. Integrated Reliability Performance Evaluation System
6.2 PRODUCE SCENARIO DATA FROM OUTCOME
Using the data from the live fire experiments, scenarios data files should
be produced. See Section 3.1.
6.3 SIMULATE TO PRODUCE OPERATIONAL EVALUATION
The produced data files should be subjected to the same analysis process
we have executed in Section 4 for the NSWC-supplied scenario. From this
analysis, reliability thresholds are established for use in the management of




Using the threshold values established, the management decisions
required are made. This will result in ammunition getting to fleet user
which has been affected by this process. The ammunition will thus be used in
subsequent live fire experiments. Hence, there will exist a feedback from
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